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Abstract
In a bilateral oligopoly, with large traders, represented as atoms, and
small traders, represented by an atomless part, when is there a non-empty
intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations? Us-
ing a two-commodity version of the Shapley window model, we show that
a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a
Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of the two
commodities. We provide four examples which show that this characteriza-
tion holds non-vacuously. When our condition fails to hold, we also confirm,
through some examples, the result obtained by Okuno et al. (1980): small
traders always have a negligible influence on prices, while the large traders
keep their strategic power even when their behavior turns out to be Wal-
rasian in the cooperative framework considered by Gabszewicz and Mertens
(1971) and Shitovitz (1973).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D51.
1 Introduction
In his celebrated paper, Aumann (1964) proved that, in exchange economies with
a continuum of traders, the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations. Some
years later, Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973) introduced the
notion of a mixed exchange economy, i.e., an exchange economy with large traders,
represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part, in order
to analyze oligopoly in a general equilibrium framework. Gabszewicz and Mertens
(1971) showed that, if atoms are not “too” big, the core still coincides with the set
of Walras allocations whereas Shitovitz (1973), in his Theorem B, proved that this
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result also holds if the atoms are of the same type, i.e., have the same endowments
and preferences.
Okuno et al. (1980) considered the result obtained by Shitovitz (1973) so
counterintuitive to call into question the use of the core as the solution concept to
study oligopoly in general equilibrium.1 This led them to replace the core with the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a model of simultaneous, noncooperative exchange
between large traders and small traders as the appropriate solution for the analysis
of oligopoly in general equilibrium. The model of noncooperative exchange they
used belongs to a line of research initiated by Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik
(see Giraud (2003) for a survey of this literature). In particular, they considered a
mixed exchange economy with two commodities which are both held by all traders.
Moreover, they assumed that no trader is allowed to be both buyer and seller of
any commodity. In this framework, they showed that, if there are two atoms of
the same type who demand, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a positive amount
of the two commodities, then the corresponding Cournot-Nash allocation is not
a Walras allocation. Therefore, under the assumptions of Shitovitz’s Theorem
B, demanding a non-null amount of the two commodities by all the atoms is a
sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation not to be a Walras allocation.
This proposition allowed Okuno et al. (1980) to conclude that the noncooperative
model they considered is a useful one to study oligopoly in a general equilibrium
framework as the small traders always have a negligible influence on prices, while
the large traders keep their strategic power even when their behavior turns out to
be Walrasian in the cooperative framework considered by Shitovitz (1973).
In this paper, we raise the question whether, in mixed exchange economies,
an equivalence, or at least a nonempty intersection, between the sets of Walras
and Cournot-Nash allocations may hold. In order to further simplify our anal-
ysis, we consider the model of bilateral oligopoly introduced by Gabszewicz and
Michel (1997) and further analyzed by Bloch and Ghosal (1997), Bloch and Ferrer
(2001), Dickson and Hartley (2008), Amir and Bloch (2009), among others. By
using this model, we still remain in a two-commodity setting but we assume that
each trader holds only one of the two commodities whose aggregate amount is
strictly positive in the economy. In particular, we shall use a bilateral oligopoly
version of the Shapley window model. This model was first proposed informally by
Lloyd S. Shapley and further analyzed, in the case of finite economies, by Sahi and
Yao (1989), in economies with an atomless continuum of traders, by Codognato
and Ghosal (2000), and, in mixed exchange economies, by Busetto et al. (2011).
In particular, Codognato and Ghosal (2000) proved that the sets of Walras and
Cournot-Nash allocations coincide in economies with an atomless continuum of
traders, thereby providing a noncooperative version of Aumann’s theorem. Here,
we first show, through some examples, that this threefold equivalence may not
hold, in the bilateral oligopoly configuration, even under the assumptions made
by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973), thereby confirming the
result obtained by Okuno et al. (1980). We then answer our main question by
1Okuno et al. (1980) did not quote the result obtained by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971).
Nevertheless, their argument also holds, mutatis mutandis, for this result.
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proving a theorem which states that demanding a null amount of one of the two
commodities by all the atoms is a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-
Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation. We also provide four examples which
show that this characterization theorem is non-vacuous. Our result depends only
on atoms’ demand behavior at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This opens the door
to a research on the conditions on the primitives of the model, i.e., traders’ size,
endowments, and preferences, under which our theorem holds. We start an inves-
tigation in this direction by providing a necessary condition, expressed in terms
of bounds on atoms’ marginal rates of substitution, for our result to hold when
atoms’ preferences are represented by additively separable utility functions as is
the case for all the examples considered in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the mathematical
model. In Section 3, we state the main equivalence theorems. In Section 4, we
provide some examples and we state and prove our main theorem together with
two propositions. In Section 5, we draw some conclusions from our analysis.2
2 The mathematical model
We consider a pure exchange economy with large traders, represented as atoms,
and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space of traders is denoted
by the measure space (T, T , µ), where T is the set of traders, T is the σ-algebra
of all µ-measurable subsets of T , and µ is a real valued, non-negative, countably
additive measure defined on T . We assume that (T, T , µ) is finite, i.e., µ(T ) <∞.
This implies that the measure space (T, T , µ) contains at most countably many
atoms. Let T0 denote the atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a set of
measure 0. Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout the paper.
Thus, a statement asserted for “each” trader in a certain set is to be understood
to hold for all such traders except possibly for a null set of traders. A coalition is
a nonnull element of T . The word “integrable” is to be understood in the sense of
Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are 2 different commodities. A commodity
bundle is a point in R2+. An assignment (of commodity bundles to traders) is an
integrable function x: T → R2+. There is a fixed initial assignment w, satisfying
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There is a coalition S such that w1(t) > 0, w2(t) = 0, for each
t ∈ S, and w1(t) = 0, w2(t) > 0, for each t ∈ Sc.
An allocation is an assignment x for which
∫
T
x(t) dµ =
∫
T
w(t) dµ. The pref-
erences of each trader t ∈ T are described by a utility function ut : R2+ → R,
satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
2
+ → R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-
concave, for each t ∈ T .
2In the online appendix, we prove that our main theorem can be extended, in bilateral
oligopoly, to other models of noncooperative exchange.
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Let B(R2+) denote the Borel σ-algebra of R2+. Moreover, let T
⊗B denote the
σ-algebra generated by the sets E × F such that E ∈ T and F ∈ B.
Assumption 3. u : T ×R2+ → R, given by u(t, x) = ut(x), for each t ∈ T and for
each x ∈ R2+, is T
⊗B-measurable.
An allocation y dominates an allocation x via a coalition S if ut(y(t)) ≥
ut(x(t)), for each t ∈ S, ut(y(t)) > ut(x(t)), for a nonnull subset of traders t
in S, and
∫
S
y(t) dµ =
∫
S
w(t) dµ. The core is the set of all allocations which are
not dominated via any coalition.
A price vector is a nonnull vector p ∈ R2+. A Walras equilibrium is a pair
(p∗,x∗), consisting of a price vector p∗ and an allocation x∗, such that p∗x∗(t) =
p∗w(t) and ut(x∗(t)) ≥ ut(y), for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : p∗x = p∗w(t)}, for each t ∈ T .
A Walras allocation is an allocation x∗ for which there exists a price vector p∗ such
that the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras equilibrium.
We now introduce the strategic market game considering the two-commodity
version of the reformulation of the Shapley window model proposed by Busetto
et al. (2011). A strategy correspondence is a correspondence B : T → P(R4+)
such that, for each t ∈ T , B(t) = {b ∈ R4+ :
∑2
j=1 bij ≤ wi(t), i = 1, 2}, where
bij represents the amount of commodity i that trader t offers in exchange for
commodity j. A strategy selection is an integrable function b : T → R4, such
that, for each t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t). Given a strategy selection b, we define the
aggregate matrix B = (
∫
T
bij(t) dµ). Moreover, we denote by b \ b(t) the strategy
selection obtained from b by replacing b(t) with b(t) ∈ B(t) and by B \ b(t) the
corresponding aggregate matrix.
We then introduce two further definitions (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Definition 1. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if, for every
pair (i, j), with i 6= j, there is a positive integer k such that a(k)ij > 0, where a(k)ij
denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power Ak of A.
Definition 2. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is said to be market
clearing if
p ∈ R2++,
2∑
i=1
pibij = p
j(
2∑
i=1
bji), j = 1, 2. (1)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar multiple,
price vector p satisfying (1) if and only if B is irreducible. Then, we denote by
p(b) a function which associates with each strategy selection b the unique, up to
a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1), if B is irreducible, and is equal to
0, otherwise.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p, consider the assignment
determined as follows:
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t)−
2∑
i=1
bji(t) +
2∑
i=1
bij(t)
pi
pj
, if p ∈ R2++,
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t), otherwise,
4
j = 1, 2, for each t ∈ T .
Given a strategy selection b and the function p(b), the traders’ final holdings
are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed by the assignment
x(t) = x(t,b(t), p(b)),
for each t ∈ T .3 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an allocation.
We are now able to define a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for this re-
formulation of the Shapley window model (see Codognato and Ghosal (2000) and
Busetto et al. (2011)).
Definition 3. A strategy selection bˆ such that Bˆ is irreducible is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium if
ut(x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, bˆ \ b(t), p(bˆ \ b(t)))),
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .4
A Cournot-Nash allocation is an allocation xˆ such that xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)),
for each t ∈ T , where bˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
3 The equivalence theorems
The following theorem reminds us that, when the space of traders is atomless,
the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations as proved by Aumann (1964)
which, in turn, coincides with the set Cournot-Nash allocations of the Shapley
window model as shown by Codognato and Ghosal (2000).
Theorem 1 [Aumann (1964), Codognato and Ghosal (2000)]. Under Assumptions
1, 2, and 3, if T = T0, then the core coincides with the sets of Walras and Cournot-
Nash allocations.
Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973) showed that an equiv-
alence between the core and the set of Walras allocations may hold even when
the space of traders contains atoms. In order to state their two main theo-
rems, we need to introduce some further notation and definitions. Two traders
τ, ρ ∈ T are said to be of the same type if w(τ) = w(ρ) and uτ (·) = uρ(·). Let
A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak, . . .} be a partition of the set of atoms T \ T0 such that Ak
contains all the atoms who are of the same type as an atom τk ∈ Ak, for each
k = 1, . . . , |A|, where |A| denotes the cardinality of the partition A. Moreover, let
Tk be the set of the traders t ∈ T who are of the same type as the atoms in Ak,
for each k = 1, . . . , |A|. Given a set Tk, denote by τhk the h-th atom belonging to
the set Tk, for each h = 1, . . . , |Ak|, where |Ak| denotes the cardinality of the set
Ak. We can now state the two theorems.
3In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by x both the function x(t) and
the function x(t,b(t), p(b)).
4Let us notice that, as this definition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium explicitly refers to irre-
ducible matrices, it applies only to active Cournot-Nash equilibria (on this point, see Sahi and
Yao (1989)).
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Theorem 2 [Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971)]. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3,
if, either |A| = 1 and∑|A1|
h=1
µ(τh1)
µ(T1)
< 1, or, |A| > 1 and ∑|A|k=1∑|Ak|h=1 µ(τhk)µ(Tk) ≤ 1, then the core coincides
with the set of Walras allocations.
Theorem 3 [Shitovitz (1973)]. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if |A| = 1 and
|A1| ≥ 2, then the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations.
Okuno et al. (1980) already showed that the equivalence stated by Theorem 3
(Shitovitz’s Theorem B) does not extend to the set of Cournot-Nash allocations,
thereby breaking the symmetry of Theorem 1. In the next section, we further
investigate the relation between the core and the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash
allocations.
4 Some examples, two propositions, and a theo-
rem
In the following example (Example 1 in Shitovitz (1973)), the market of commodity
2 is monopolistic. The example shows that Theorems 2 and 3 cannot be extended
to this case as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) = 1. Moreover, in this market
configuration, the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations are disjoint as
there is no Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Example 1. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0, w(2) = (0, 4),
u2(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2. Then, there is an allocation in the core, which is not a Walras
allocation, and there is no Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) = (1, 1),
(x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (2, 2). As shown by
Shitovitz (1973), the allocation x˜ such that (x˜1(t), x˜2(t)) = (1, 1), for each t ∈ T0,
(x˜1(2), x˜2(2)) = (3, 3) is in the core but it is not a Walras allocation. Suppose that
there is a Cournot-Nash allocation xˆ. Then, there is a strategy selection bˆ which is
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is such that xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each
t ∈ T . In particular, x(2, bˆ(2), p(bˆ)) = (bˆ12, 4 − bˆ21(2)). Let b′(2) be a strategy
such that 0 < b′21(2) < bˆ21(2). Then,
u2(x(2, bˆ \ b′(2), p(bˆ \ b′(2)))) > u2(x(2, bˆ(2), p(bˆ))),
as x(2, bˆ \ b′(2), p(bˆ \ b′(2))) = (bˆ12, 4− b′21(2)) and u2(·) is strongly monotone, a
contradiction. Then, there is no Cournot-Nash allocation.
In the following example, all traders have the same utility function as in Ex-
ample 1 but a competitive fringe competes with the monopolist in the market
for commodity 2. The core coincides with the set of Walras allocations as the
assumptions of Theorem 2 are satisfied but no Cournot-Nash allocation is in the
core.
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Example 2. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2. Then,
there is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
but which is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
3, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
3+1
, 12√
3+1
), for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) =
( 4√
3+3
, 4
√
3√
3+1
), for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = ( 4√
3+3
, 4
√
3√
3+1
). Then, by The-
orem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core
as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash
allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ which is a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . But
then, b∗ must be such that b∗12(t) =
4
√
3√
3+1
, for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], b∗21(t) =
4√
3+1
,
for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], b∗21(2) =
4√
3+1
. However, it is straightforward to verify that
b∗(2) /∈ argmax{u2(x(t,b∗ \ b(2), p(b∗ \ b(2)))) : b(2) ∈ B(2)}, a contradiction.
Then, the unique Walras allocation is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
In the following example, all traders have the same utility function as in Exam-
ple 1 but there are two oligopolists of the same type in the market for commodity
2. The core coincides with the set of Walras allocations as the assumptions of
Theorem 3 are satisfied but no Cournot-Nash allocation is in the core.
Example 3. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0,
w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique
allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation but which is not
a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
2, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
2+1
, 8√
2+1
), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) =
( 4√
2+2
, 4
√
2√
2+1
). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique Walras allocation is also the
unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. Suppose that x∗ is
also a Cournot-Nash allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ which is
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for
each t ∈ T . But then, b∗ must be such that b∗12(t) = 4
√
2√
2+1
, for each t ∈ T0,
b∗21(2) = b
∗
21(3) =
4√
2+1
. However, it is straightforward to verify that b∗(2) /∈
argmax{u2(x(t,b∗ \ b(2), p(b∗ \ b(2)))) : b(2) ∈ B(2)}, a contradiction. Then, the
unique Walras allocation is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
In Examples 2 and 3, there are atoms who demand a strictly positive amount
of both commodities at a Walras equilibrium and the sets of Walras and Cournot-
Nash allocations are disjoint. The following proposition generalizes these examples
providing a necessary condition for a Walras allocation to be a Cournot-Nash
allocation. In order to state the proposition, we need a further assumption on
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traders’ utility functions.
Assumption 4. ut : R
2
+ → R is differentiable, for each t ∈ T \ T0.5
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, if the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras
equilibrium such that x∗(τ)À 0, for an atom τ ∈ T \T0, then x∗ is not a Cournot-
Nash allocation.
Proof. Suppose that the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras equilibrium such that x∗(τ)À 0,
for an atom τ ∈ T \ T0. Moreover, suppose that x∗ is a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each
t ∈ T , where b∗ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since, given a trader t ∈ T ,
p(b∗)x∗(t) = p(b∗)w(t) and p∗ is the unique price vector such that p∗x∗(t) =
p∗w(t), p∗ = p(b∗). Consider the atom τ ∈ T \ T0 and assume, without loss of
generality, that w1(τ) = 0 and w2(τ) > 0. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for the
atom τ , the marginal rate of substitution must be equal to the marginal rate at
which he can trade off commodity 1 for commodity 2 (see Okuno et al. (1980)).
Moreover, at a Walras equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution must be equal
to the relative price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2. These two conditions
are expressed by the following equations:
dx2
dx1
= −p
∗1
p∗2
b∗21
b∗21 − b∗21(τ)µ(τ)
= −p
∗1
p∗2
.
Then, we must have b∗21(τ) = 0. But then, (x
∗1(τ),x∗2(τ)) = (0,w2(τ)), a contra-
diction. Hence, x∗ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 2 only in that the monopolist and
the competitive fringe have quasi-linear utility functions. It shows that, under
the assumptions of Theorem 2, the converse of Proposition 1 does not hold. At
the unique Walras equilibrium, both the monopolist and the competitive fringe
demand a null amount of commodity 2 and this unique Walras allocation is also
the unique allocation in the core but it is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 4. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 + 1
10
x2, for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) =
√
x1 + 1
10
x2. Then,
there is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
but which is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
21+3
2
, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 8√
21+5
, 12), for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) =
( 8√
21+3
, 0), for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = ( 8√
21+3
, 0). Then, by Theo-
rem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as
|A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash
5In this assumption, differentiability should be implicitly understood to include the case of
infinite partial derivatives along the boundary of the consumption set (for a discussion of this
case, see, for instance, Kreps (2012), p. 58).
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allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ which is a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . But
then, b∗ must be such that b∗12(t) =
4
√
21+12√
21+5
, for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], b∗21(t) = 4,
for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], b∗12(2) = 4. However, it is straightforward to verify that
b∗(2) /∈ argmax{u2(x(t,b∗ \ b(2), p(b∗ \ b(2)))) : b(2) ∈ B(2)}, a contradiction.
Then, the unique Walras allocation is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 3 only in that the two oligopolists
have quasi-linear utility functions. It shows that, under the assumptions of Theo-
rem 3, the converse of Proposition 1 does not hold. At the unique Walras equilib-
rium, the two oligopolists demand a null amount of commodity 2 and this unique
Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core but it is not a Cournot-
Nash allocation.
Example 5. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0,
w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1 + 1
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x2. Then, there is a unique
allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation but which is not
a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) = (
√
3+
1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
3+2
, 8), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) =
( 4√
3+1
, 0). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allo-
cation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash
allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection b∗ which is a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . But then, b∗
must be such that b∗12(t) =
4
√
3+4√
3+2
, for each t ∈ T0, b∗21(2) = b∗21(3) = 4. However,
it is straightforward to verify that b∗(2) /∈ argmax{u2(x(t,b∗ \b(2), p(b∗ \b(2)))) :
b(2) ∈ B(2)}, a contradiction. Then, the unique Walras allocation is not a
Cournot-Nash allocation.
We now address the question whether, in mixed exchange economies, an equiva-
lence, or at least a nonempty intersection, between the sets of Walras and Cournot-
Nash allocations may hold. The following example differs from Example 4 only for
the lower “weight” of commodity 2 for traders who have quasi-linear utility func-
tions. At the unique Walras equilibrium, both the monopolist and the competitive
fringe demand a null amount of commodity 2 and this unique Walras allocation is
also the unique allocation in the core and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 6. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 + 1
30
x2, for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) =
√
x1 + 1
30
x2. Then,
there is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(
√
21+3
2
, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 8√
21+5
, 12), for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) =
9
( 8√
21+3
, 0), for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = ( 8√
21+3
, 0). Then, by Theo-
rem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as
|A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Moreover, the strategy selection b∗, where
b∗12(t) =
4
√
21+12√
21+5
, for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], b∗21(t) = 4, for each t ∈ [12 , 1], b∗21(2) = 4, is
the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium and x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T .
Then, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 5 only for the lower “weight” of
commodity 2 for traders who have quasi-linear utility functions. At the unique
Walras equilibrium, the two oligopolists demand a null amount of commodity 2
and this unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core and the
unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 7. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0,
w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1 + 1
30
x2. Then, there is a unique
allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation and the unique
Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) = (
√
3+
1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = ( 4√
3+2
, 8), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) =
( 4√
3+1
, 0). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique
allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. Moreover, the strategy selection
b∗, where b∗12(t) =
4
√
3+4√
3+2
, for each t ∈ T0, b∗21(2) = b∗21(3) = 4, is the unique
Cournot-Nash equilibrium and x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . Then,
the unique Walras allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Examples 6 and 7 differ from Examples 4 and 5 as, in the latter, all atoms
who hold commodity 2 demand a null amount of this commodity at a Walras
equilibrium but not at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium whereas, in the former, they
also demand a null amount of commodity 2 at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The
following theorem generalizes Examples 6 and 7 as it shows that demanding a null
amount of one of the two commodities by all the atoms is a necessary and sufficient
condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation.
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let bˆ be a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and let pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Then, the
pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium if and only if xˆ1(t) = 0 or xˆ2(t) = 0, for each
t ∈ T \ T0.
Proof. Let bˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) =
x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equi-
librium. Moreover, suppose that xˆ(τ)À 0, for an atom τ ∈ T \T0. Then, xˆ is not
a Cournot-Nash allocation, by Proposition 1, a contradiction. Hence, xˆ1(t) = 0 or
xˆ2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0. Conversely, suppose that xˆ1(t) = 0 or xˆ2(t) = 0,
for each t ∈ T \ T0. Consider an atom τ ∈ T \ T0 and assume, without loss of
generality, that w1(τ) = 0 and w2(τ) > 0. Consider the case where xˆ1(τ) = 0.
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Then, bˆ21(τ) = 0 and xˆ(τ) = (0,w
2(τ)). We have that pˆxˆ(τ) = pˆw(τ) since
pˆ1xˆ1(τ) + pˆ2xˆ2(τ) = pˆ10 + pˆ2(w2(τ)− 0) = pˆ2w2(τ).
Let xˆ2(x1) be a function such that uτ (x
1, xˆ2(x1)) ≡ uτ (xˆ(τ)), for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤
w2(τ) pˆ
2
pˆ1
. We have that
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
bˆ21 − bˆ21(τ)µ(τ)
bˆ21
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≤ 0
as bˆ21(τ) = 0. Then,
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≤ 0
as bˆ21−0
bˆ21
= 1. But then, dxˆ
2(0)
dx1
≥ − pˆ1
pˆ2
. Consider the case where dxˆ
2(0)
dx1
= − pˆ1
pˆ2
.
Then, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}, as uτ (·) is quasi-
concave, by Assumption 2. Consider now the case where dxˆ
2(0)
dx1
> − pˆ1
pˆ2
. Then,
dxˆ2(x1)
dx1
> − pˆ1
pˆ2
, for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
, as uτ (·) is quasi-concave, by Assumption
2. Suppose that there exists a commodity bundle x˜ ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}
such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)). Then, x˜
2 > xˆ2(x˜1) as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by
Assumption 2. But then, by the Mean Value Theorem, there exists some x¯1 such
that 0 < x¯1 < x˜1 and such that
dxˆ2(x¯1)
dx1
=
xˆ2(0)− xˆ2(x˜1)
0− x˜1 < −
pˆ1
pˆ2
,
a contradiction. Therefore, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}.
Consider now the case where xˆ2(τ) = 0. Then, bˆ21(τ) = w
2(τ) and xˆ(τ) =
(w2(τ) pˆ
2
pˆ1
, 0). We have that pˆxˆ(τ) = pˆw(τ) since
pˆ1xˆ1(τ) + pˆ2xˆ2(τ) = pˆ1w2(τ)
pˆ2
pˆ1
+ pˆ2(w2(τ)−w2(τ)) = pˆ2w2(τ).
Let xˆ2(x1) be a function such that uτ (x
1, xˆ2(x1)) ≡ uτ (xˆ(τ)), for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤
w2(τ) pˆ
2
pˆ1
. We have that
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
bˆ21 − bˆ21(τ)µ(τ)
bˆ21
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≥ 0
as bˆ21(τ) = w
2(τ). Then,
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
pˆ2
pˆ1
− ∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
> 0
as bˆ21−w
2(τ)µ(τ)
bˆ21
< 1. But then, dxˆ
2(x1)
dx1
< − pˆ1
pˆ2
, for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
, as uτ (·)
is quasi-concave, by Assumption 2. Suppose that there exists a commodity bundle
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x˜ ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)} such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)). Then, x˜2 > xˆ2(x˜1)
as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. But then, by the Mean Value
Theorem, there exists some x¯1 such that x˜1 < x¯1 < w2(τ) pˆ
2
pˆ1
and such that
dxˆ2(x¯1)
dx1
=
xˆ2(x˜1)− xˆ2(w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
)
x˜1 −w2(τ) pˆ2
pˆ1
> − pˆ
1
pˆ2
,
a contradiction. Therefore, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}.
We then conclude that pˆxˆ(t) = pˆw(t) and ut(xˆ(t)) ≥ ut(y) for all y ∈ {x ∈
Rl+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}, for each t ∈ T \ T0. Moreover, it is straightforward to show
(see, for instance, Proposition 3 in Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2013)) that
pˆxˆ(t) = pˆw(t) and ut(xˆ(t)) ≥ ut(y) for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}, for each
t ∈ T0. Hence, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium.
Examples 6 and 7 show that Theorem 4 is non-vacuous when atoms demand,
at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a null amount of the commodity they hold. The
following two examples show that it is also non-vacuous when atoms demand, at
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a null amount of the commodity they do not hold.
The structure of the following example differs from that of Example 6 for a
further competitive fringe which holds commodity 2 and is not of the same type
as the monopolist. At the unique Walras equilibrium, both the monopolist and
the competitive fringe with traders of the same type as the monopolist demand a
null amount of commodity 1 and this unique Walras allocation is also the unique
allocation in the core and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 8. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1
3
], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [1
3
, 2
3
], w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
1
4
x1 +
√
x2, for each
t ∈ [2
3
, 1], w(2) = (0, 4), u2(x) =
1
4
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique allocation in
the core which is also the unique Walras allocation and the unique Cournot-Nash
allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) = (1, 1),
(x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [0, 1
3
], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈
[1
3
, 2
3
], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (0, 4), for each t ∈ [2
3
, 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (0, 4). Then,
by Theorem 2, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the
core as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Moreover, the strategy selection b∗,
where b∗12(t) = 2, for each t ∈ [0, 13 ], b∗21(t) = 2, for each t ∈ [13 , 23 ], b∗21(t) = 0, for
each t ∈ [2
3
, 1], b∗21(2) = 0, is the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium and x
∗(t) =
x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . Then, the unique Walras allocation is also the
unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
The structure of the following example differs from that of Example 7 for a
further competitive fringe which holds commodity 2 and is not of the same type
as the two oligopolists. At the unique Walras equilibrium, the two oligopolists
demand a null amount of commodity 1 and this unique Walras allocation is also
the unique allocation in the core and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
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Example 9. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
],
w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [1
2
, 1], w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4),
u2(x) = u3(x) =
1
4
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique allocation in the core which
is also the unique Walras allocation and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p∗2) =
(1, 1), (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [0, 1
2
], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each
t ∈ [1
2
, 1], (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = (0, 4). Then, by Theorem 3, the
unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and
|A1| = 2. Moreover, the strategy selection b∗, where b∗12(t) = 2, for each t ∈ [0, 12 ],
b∗21(t) = 2, for each t ∈ [12 , 1], b∗21(2) = b∗21(3) = 0, is the unique Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . Then, the unique Walras
allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
In all the examples of this section, preferences are represented by additively
separable utility functions, i.e., utility functions of the form u(x) = v1(x1)+v2(x2),
for each x ∈ R2+. We conclude this section by providing a necessary condition
for Theorem 4 to hold when atoms’ preferences are represented by an additively
separable utility function.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let bˆ be a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Then, for each t ∈ T \T0
such that ut(x) = v
1
t (x
1) + v2t (x
2), xˆ1(t) = 0 only if −∂ut(0,x2)
∂x1
/∂ut(0,x
2)
∂x2
> −∞, for
each x2 ∈ R+, and xˆ2(t) = 0 only if −∂ut(x1,0)∂x1 /∂ut(x
1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+.
Proof. Let bˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for
each t ∈ T . Moreover, let pˆ = p(bˆ). Consider an atom τ ∈ T \ T0 such that
uτ (x) = v
1
τ (x
1) + v2τ (x
2) . Suppose that xˆ1(τ) = 0. By the same argument used in
the proof of Theorem 4, it follows that
−
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≥ − pˆ
1
pˆ2
.
Then,
−
∂uτ (0,xˆ2(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (0,xˆ2(τ))
∂x2
> −∞.
But then, ∂uτ (0,xˆ
2(τ))
∂x1
= ∂v
1
τ (0)
∂x1
= ∂uτ (0,x
2)
∂x1
< +∞, for each x2 ∈ R+. Moreover,∂uτ (0,x2)∂x2 >
0, for each x2 ∈ R+, as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. Therefore,
−∂uτ (0,x2)
∂x1
/∂uτ (0,x
2)
∂x2
> −∞, for each x2 ∈ R+. Suppose that xˆ2(τ) = 0. By the
same argument used in the proof of Theorem 4, it follows that
−
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
< − pˆ
1
pˆ2
.
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Then,
−
∂uτ (xˆ1(τ),0)
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ1(τ),0)
∂x2
< 0.
But then, ∂uτ (xˆ
1(τ),0)
∂x2
= ∂v
2
τ (0)
∂x2
= ∂uτ (x
1,0)
∂x2
< +∞, for each x1 ∈ R+. Moreover,∂uτ (x1,0)∂x1 >
0, for each x1 ∈ R+, as uτ (·) is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. Therefore,
−∂uτ (x1,0)
∂x1
/∂uτ (x
1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+. Hence, for each t ∈ T \ T0 such that
ut(x) = v
1
t (x
1) + v2t (x
2), xˆ1(t) = 0 only if −∂ut(0,x2)
∂x1
/∂ut(0,x
2)
∂x2
> −∞, for each
x2 ∈ R+, and xˆ2(t) = 0 only if −∂ut(x1,0)∂x1 /∂ut(x
1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reconsidered, in the framework of bilateral oligopoly, the
problem raised by Okuno et al. (1980) about the noncooperative foundation of
oligopolistic behavior in general equilibrium. We can now summarize the impli-
cations of the previous analysis. The condition which requires that the atoms are
not “too” big, introduced by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971), is not necessary for
the equivalence between the core and the set of Walras allocations, as shown by
Theorem 3, but it is sufficient for this equivalence, by Theorem 2; moreover, it
is neither necessary nor sufficient for a nonempty intersection between the sets
of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations as shown, respectively, by Examples 7
and 4. The condition which requires that there are only atoms of the same type,
introduced by Shitovitz (1973), is not necessary for the equivalence between the
core and the set of Walras allocations, as shown by Theorem 2, but it is sufficient
for this equivalence, by Theorem 3; moreover, it is neither necessary nor sufficient
for a nonempty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allo-
cations as shown, respectively, by Examples 6 and 5. Theorem 4 states that the
condition which characterizes the nonempty intersection of the sets of Walras and
Cournot-Nash allocations requires that each atom demands a null amount of one
commodity. Moreover, Examples 6, 7, 8, and 9 show that this characterization
condition is non-vacuous. Proposition 2 provides a rationale for these examples by
exhibiting a necessary condition, expressed in terms of bounds on atoms’ marginal
rates of substitution, for Theorem 4 to hold when atoms’ preferences are repre-
sented by additively separable utility functions, the same class considered in the
examples. We leave as an open problem for further research the generalization
of this proposition, namely, the determination of more general assumptions on
traders’ size, endowments, and preferences under which our characterization con-
dition holds. This analysis could help to understand more deeply which are the
differences between atoms’ Walrasian behavior in a cooperative and in a noncoop-
erative framework. Some further research should also be devoted to the possibility
of generalizing the results achieved in this paper to an exchange economy with
more than two commodities.
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Online Appendix to
“Atomic Cournotian Traders May Be Walrasian”
Giulio Codognato∗, Sayantan Ghosal†, Simone Tonin‡
Discussion of the model
The Shapley window model (Model 1 hereafter) is one of the two models in
the literature referring to Shapley and Shubik in which markets are complete,
i.e., all commodities can be used for trade. In the other model analyzed by
Amir et al. (1990) (Model 2 hereafter), separate exchange and pricing is set
up for each pair of commodities, the price in a market being the ratio of the
total amount of bids in each of the two commodities which are exchanged
in that market. Therefore, in this model, there is one market and one price
for each pair of commodities.
In general, with more than two commodities, the sets of Cournot-Nash
allocations of the two models differ as, in Model 1, prices are determined for
each commodity whereas, in Model 2, prices are determined for each market
where pairs of commodities are exchanged and, consequently, they are not
necessarily consistent through pairs of markets in which a same commodity
is exchanged.
Codognato (2000) started to investigate whether there might be ex-
change economies in which the sets of Cournot-Nash allocations of the two
models coincide. In particular, he proved that the two sets coincide, in ex-
change economies with an atomless continuum of traders, when prices in
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Model 2 are consistent at Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Here, we address the question whether this equivalence also holds in
the mixed bilateral oligopoly framework, thereby extending to Model 2 the
results obtained for Model 1 in Section 4.
We now introduce Model 2.
Definition 4. Given a strategy selection b, the 2 × 2 matrix P is said to
be the price matrix generated by b if
pij =
{
bij
bji
if bji 6= 0,
0 if bji = 0,
i, j = 1, 2.
We denote by P (b) a function which associates with each strategy se-
lection b the price matrix P generated by b.
Given a strategy selection b and a price matrix P , consider the assign-
ment determined as follows:
xj(t,b(t), P ) = wj(t)−
2∑
i=1
bji(t) +
2∑
i=1
bij(t)pij,
j = 1, 2, for each t ∈ T .
Given a strategy selection b and the function P (b), the traders’ final
holdings are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed
by the assignment
x(t) = x(t,b(t), P (b)),
for each t ∈ T .1 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an
allocation.
We are now able to define a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for
Model 2.
Definition 5. A strategy selection b˜ such that B˜ is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜))) ≥ ut(x(t, b˜ \ b(t), P (b˜ \ b(t)))),
1In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by x both the function x(t)
and the function x(t,b(t), P (b)).
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for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .2
A Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2 is an allocation x˜ such that x˜(t) =
x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜)), for each t ∈ T , where b˜ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
Model 2.
The following lemma establishes a relation between prices and hence
traders’ final holdings of the two models for strategy selections whose ag-
gregate matrices are irreducible.
Lemma. If b is a strategy selection such that B is irreducible, then p
i(b)
pj(b)
=
pji(b), i, j = 1, 2, and x(t,b(t), p(b)) = x(t,b(t), P (b)), for each t ∈ T .
Proof. Let b be a strategy selection such that B is irreducible. Then, from
Definitions 2 and 4, we have p
i(b)
pj(b)
=
bji
bij
= pji(b), i, j = 1, 2. But then,
x(t,b(t), p(b)) = x(t,b(t), P (b)), for each t ∈ T .
The following theorem shows an equivalence between the sets of Cournot-
Nash allocations of Model 1 and Model 2.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the sets of Cournot-Nash
allocations of Model 1 and Model 2 coincide.
Proof. Let xˆ be a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1. Then, there is a
strategy selection bˆ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Model 1 and is
such that xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that xˆ is not a
Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2. Then, there exists a trader τ ∈ T and
a strategy b(τ) ∈ B(τ) such that
uτ (x(τ, bˆ \ b(τ), P (bˆ \ b(τ)))) > uτ (x(τ, bˆ(τ), P (bˆ))).
x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ)) = x(τ, bˆ(τ), P (b)), by the Lemma, as Bˆ is irreducible. Sup-
pose that the matrix Bˆ\b(τ) is irreducible. Then, x(τ, bˆ\b(τ), p(bˆ\b(τ))) =
x(τ, bˆ \ b(τ), P (bˆ \ b(τ))), by the Lemma. But then,
uτ (x(τ, bˆ \ b(τ), p(bˆ \ b(τ)))) > uτ (x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ))),
a contradiction. Suppose that the matrix Bˆ \ b(τ) is not irreducible. Then,
τ ∈ T \T0 as Bˆ\b(t) = Bˆ, for each t ∈ T0. Assume, without loss of generality,
2According to Amir et al. (1990), the market for commodities 1 and 2 is active if
b12 > 0 and b21 > 0 and then if and only if B˜ is irreducible. Therefore, as this definition
of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium explicitly refers to irreducible matrices, it applies only to
Cournot-Nash equilibria at which the market for commodities 1 and 2 is active.
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that w1(τ) = 0 and w2(τ) > 0. Then, bˆ21(τ) = bˆ21 as the matrix Bˆ \ b(τ)
is not irreducible. But then, x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ)) = (bˆ12,w
2(τ) − bˆ21(τ)). Let
b′(τ) be a strategy such that 0 < b′21(τ) < bˆ21(τ). Then,
uτ (x(τ, bˆ \ b′(τ), p(bˆ \ b′(τ)))) > uτ (x(τ, bˆ(τ), p(bˆ))),
as x(τ, bˆ \ b′(τ), p(bˆ \ b′(τ))) = (bˆ12,w2(τ) − b′21(τ)) and uτ (·) is strongly
monotone, by Assumption 2, a contradiction. Therefore, xˆ is a Cournot-
Nash allocation of Model 2. Let x˜ be a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model
2. Suppose that x˜ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1. Then, the
previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to the same kind of contradic-
tions. Therefore, x˜ is a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1. Hence, the
sets of Cournot-Nash allocations of Model 1 and Model 2 coincide.
The following corollary shows that Theorem 4 extends, mutatis mutan-
dis, to Model 2.
Corollary. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let b˜ be a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Model 2 and let p˜ = (b˜21, b˜12) and x˜(t) = x(t, b˜(t), p(b˜)),
for each t ∈ T . Then, the pair (p˜, x˜) is a Walras equilibrium if and only if
x˜1(t) = 0 or x˜2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0.
Proof. Let b˜ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Model 2 and let p˜ =
(b˜21, b˜12) and x˜(t) = x(t, b˜(t), p(b˜)), for each t ∈ T . b˜ is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Model 1, by Theorem 5, and p˜ = (b˜21, b˜12) = (p
1(b˜), p2(b˜)),
by Definition 2. Hence, by Theorem 4, the pair (p˜, x˜) is a Walras equilibrium
if and only if x˜1(t) = 0 or x˜2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0.
Model 1 and Model 2 represent two possible generalizations of a model
proposed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) in which one commodity plays the
role of money. It is straightforward to show that, in bilateral oligopoly,
this model reduces to Model 2 once we label one of the two commodities as
money.
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